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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, a corporation,
Plaintijf-Respondent,
vs.
CARNICERO DYNASTY
CORPORATION, a corporation;
WENDELL L. BUTCHER; IRENE
B. BUTCHER; CHRIS L.
STANFIELD; JANIS B.
STANFIELD, BEN D. ISAAC;
and LILA O. ISAAC,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Case No.
13836

I
1
\

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Suit by bonding company against alleged indemnitor who signed indemnity agreement after bond had
been issued.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court refused amendment to assert defense
of lack of consideration and awarded judgment against
indemnitor for $44,600.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Order reversing judgment and dismissing case as
to defendants Butcher, or in the alternative remanding
the case for a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff (a bonding company) obtained general
indemnity agreements from defendants Stanfields and
Isaacs (Nov. 1968) the officers of defendant Carnicero
(a contractor), (Ex. 2-P). No indemnity agreement was
asked for or received from defendants Butcher at that
time. (R, 120, par. 4; 376, lines 20-24). Thereafter plaintiff issued a bid bond (R. 382) and payment and performance bonds (Jan. 6, 1969 - Ex. 4-P, R. 353) for Carnicero in connection with the construction of a post office. Over four months later plaintiff requested and received an indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P) from defendants Butcher (R. 299-302; 359; 376-387) (who was property manager of Carnicero, but was not an officer, director or stockholder of that organization) (R. 270-271).
At the time when Butchers executed the indemnity
agreement (Ex. 1-P) the plaintiff had already issued
the bond (Ex. 4-P) and was legally bound to third
parties thereon (R. 371, 380, 382). Plaintiff gave no consideration for the Butcher indemnity agreement and did
not change it's position in reliance upon that agreement,
(R. 120).
At the conclusions of the evidence the Court summarized the evidence concerning the Butcher indemnity
agreement in part as follows (R. 417):
". . . More than four months after the bond is issued,
. . . after presumably an application for a bid bond
is made and a bid bond issued, the Indemnity Agreement obtained from the others and from the corDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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poration and the bid awarded and the bonds are
issued. After all of that takes place, the insurance
company as an obvious afterthought, goes out
through their agent Mills, and he gets the signature
of Mr. & Mrs. Butcher on that type of an Indemnity
Agreement.
Now, the defense that Mr. Barker raises here is
lack of consideration. . . ." (emphasis added)
Butcher did not recall that his indemnity agreement
was signed after the bond had been issued (R. 212), was
not aware that the indemnity agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration, did not disclose those facts
to his attorney, (R, 421) who accordingly did not assert
lack of consideration as a defense in their answer. Butchers' attorney first became aware that the Butcher indemnity agreement lacked consideration when the indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P) and the bond (Ex. 4-P)
were placed into evidence by plaintiff during the trial
(R. 421). Butchers then moved the Court for dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint since the indemnity agreement
upon which the suit is based was not supported by consideration (R. 410, 417-421), and to amend their answer
to conform to the evidence adduced by plaintiff at the
trial, to assert the defense of lack of consideration (R.
122, 418-421). At the request of the Court briefs were
submitted by plaintiff (R. 131-146) and by Butchers (R.
122-130), and thereafter the Court entered a memorandum decision denying Butchers' motions and awarding
judgment against Butchers (R. 147-149).
The Court's refusal to permit Butchers to assert the
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4
defense of lack of consideration appears to be grounded
on the fact that a careful reading of plaintiff's answers
to Butchers' interrogatories and the exhibits attached
thereto would have disclosed that the defense of lack of
consideration was available to Butchers (R. 148) four
months before trial, but that since Butchers failed to
observe that fact and to make a motion to amend during
the four months between the time when plaintiff answered Butchers' interrogatories and the trial date, that
plaintiff was somehow prejudiced in preparing to meet
that issue at the trial (R. 131-146 & 148).
Plaintiff's counsel claimed that he was prejudiced in
meeting the absence of consideration defense because
of the long period of time that passed between commencement of the lawsuit and trial, and argued that
evidence which might have been available to meet that
issue, had it been raised earlier, was not available at time
of trial (R. 141, 144-145), claiming that an employee of
plaintiffs Denver office had left their employ, and that
the local agent of plaintiff had destroyed his files. However, plaintiff's witnesses (Mills, the agent who wrote
the bond) established that three or four different people
in the Denver office worked on the bond involved in this
case, that whoever happened to be in when he called
would pull the file and help him, that there was no continuity or follow through by a particular employee in
issuing the bond (R, 382-384), and that the local agent
(Mills) knew in 1970 that there were problems with the
bond (R. 383), but that he did not keep his files since
"The company has copies of everything." The long de-
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lay in bringing this matter to trial was the fault of plaintiff who for almost two years failed to request a trial
date (R. 47) and failed to respond to discovery (R. 61,
67, 69, 70), which resulted in cancellation of four scheduled trial dates, (R. 48, 67, 70, 72-74, 77, 110).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BUTCHERS HAVE NEVER BEEN LEGALLY BOUND
TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFF

Since plaintiff was bound on it's bond before it obtained Butchers' signatures on the indemnity agreement
and since plaintiff gave no consideration for that indemnity agreement, Butchers never became contracturally
obligated to indemnify plaintiff for it's losses on the
Carnicero bond. A promise of indemnity is void for want
of consideration where made after the execution of the
sureties' undertaking. Thompson v. Moe, 265 P. 457
(Wash); O'Neill v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York,
172 P. 306, 51 U. 592; Manwell v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 11
U2d 433, Latimer v. Holladay, 134 P.2d 183, 103 U. 152. 47
Am Jur 2d Suretyship, Sec. 229, Page 153; Jones v.
Shorter, 1 Ga. 294; Vansant v. Gardner, 240 Ky 318, 42
SW2d 300; 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, Sec. 86, 397.
There can be no contract where consideration is
lacking. This differs from failure of consideration where
there was in fact a contract but the promised performance fails. Williston, Contracts, 3d ed Sec. 119A. A
determination of this matter on the merits would be a
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holding that Butchers are not now and never have been
liable to plaintiff. To hold Butchers liable would be to
confer a windfall upon plaintiff who wrote the bond,
accepted a premium for the bond, and became contract u a l l y obligated on the bond without any guarantee or
agreement from Butchers. (R. 371, 380, 382). If plaintiff is denied recovery against Butchers it will be in no
worse position that it was in at the time that it accepted
the premium and wrote the bond. Plaintiff has not
changed it's position or parted with anything of value
in exchange for the Butcher indemnity agreement and it
would be unconscionable to shift plaintiff's loss (which
it assumed in exchange for a premium) to Butchers who
received no benefit or consideration for the execution of
the indemnity agreement.
It would have been better business judgment for the
plaintiff to have required additional security before
electing to issue the bond, but having made a business
judgment to issue the bond without additional security
the plaintiff is now bound by that decision and should be
limited to recovery on the security which it bargained
for in exchange for the bond.
Even if Butchers had paid plaintiff the amounts
claimed to be due under the Butcher indemnity agreement, Butchers would have been entitled to recover
those payments back from plaintiff upon discovery of
the fact that the indemnity agreement was not supported
by consideration. See Restatement Security, Sec. 152 (b)
(ii).
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POINT II
P L A I N T I F F FAILED TO MEET
PROOF AGAINST BUTCHERS

IT'S

BURDEN

OF

Plaintiff incorrectly alleged in it's complaint (without pleading dates) that the bond was issued in consideration of the Butcher indemnity agreement (R.3). Butchers did not recall and their attorney did not become
aware that the indemnity agreement was executed after
the bond was issued until plaintiff placed them in evidence at the trial, (R. 212, 421), and accordingly in their
answer Butcher did not deny plaintiffs incorrect allegations of consideration. (R, 8-9).
Plaintiff's pleadings and defendants' failure to deny
established a prima-facia case against Butchers until the
evidence which plaintiff itself introduced (bond, ex. 4-p
and indemnity agreement, ex. 1-p) superseded the general allegations of consideration contained in plaintiff's
pleadings, and established conclusively that plaintiff was
not entitled to recover against Butchers because the contract relied upon by plaintiff in it's lawsuit (Ex. 1-P)
was void and unenforceable since not supported by consideration.
Plaintiff simply introduced evidence which established conclusively that it was not entitled to recover
against Butcher. The fact that Butchers or their attorney
might have learned that the contract lacked consideration earlier so as to have alleged that defense in their
answer, by an amendment to their answer, by motion,
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etc. does not change the basic fact that Butchers are
not now and never were bound on the contract of indemnity, nor change the fact that plaintiff itself produced the evidence which conclusively established that
plaintiff had not met it's burden of proving that it was
entitled to a judgment against Butchers.
The burden of proof of all elements necessary to
establish it's case was upon plaintiff. Had plaintiff relied
upon the failure of Butchers to deny consideration and
had it not introduced evidence which disproved the false
consideration allegation in plaintiff's complaint, the
plaintiff would have been entitled to win. Having
elected to produce documents into evidence which disproved their general allegations of consideration, plaintiff is bound by those documents. The risk of non-persuasion never shifts from plaintiff as to proof of the
essential elements of it's claim, including the element
of consideration. Plaintiff prima facia satisfied it's burden of proof by Butchers failure to deny that the contract was supported by consideration, however that
prima facia satisfaction of the burden of proof was overcome by direct evidence, and that direct evidence also
conclusively established that plaintiff had not met it's
risk of non-persuasion (whcih never shifts from plaintiff). See Kartchner v. Home, 262 P.2d 749, 1 U.2d 112;
In re Swan's Estate, 293 P.2d 682, 4 U.2d 277; Peoples
Finance & Thrift Co. v. Landes, 503 P.2d 444, 28 U.2d
392; 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence, Sec. 123, 124, 125, 126, 128,
130, 142.
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It is important to clearly distinguish the difference
between an absence of consideration and a failure of consideration. Where this is no consideration there can be
no contract, but where there is a failure of consideration
there is a contract when the agreement is made, but because of some supervening cause the promised performance fails. Williston, Contracts 3d ed Sec. 119A. The
burden of proving consideration is part of plaintiff's case,
whereas if we were dealing with a failure of consideration situation the burden would be upon Butchers to
plead and prove failure of consideration. See Rule 8(c),
URCP; 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence, Sec. 142. Had plaintiff
pleaded the date of the bond and the date of the indemnity agreement the complaint would have contained a
"built-in" defense and would have been insufficient to
entitle plaintiff to recover against Butchers. See 5
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec.
1226, 1355 and cases there cited.
POINT

III

BUTCHERS ARE ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL UNDER
RULE 41(b), URCP (PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN NO
RIGHT TO R E L I E F )

Rule 41(b), URCP, reads in part as follows:
". . . After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the
court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, . . . may move
for a dismissal on ground that upon the facts and
law the plaintiff has no right to relief. . . " (Emphasis added)
Introduction of the bond (Ex. 4-P) and the Butcher
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indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P) disclosed that the bond
was issued before the indemnity agreement was signed,
and that therefore it was without consideration and was
unenforceable. Accordingly, Butchers are entitled to
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against them under
Rule 41(b), URCP, and the entry of judgment against
them was in error and should be reversed. Gregory v.
Denver Si Rio Grande Western R. Co., 8 U.(2d) 114, 329
P.2d 407; Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 122 U. 487, 252
P.2d 205, 208; 76 Am J u r 2d Trial Sec. 1245. See also
discussion under point II above distinguishing between
absence of consideration (failure of plaintiff to sustain
burden of proof of a valid enforceable contract) and
failure of consideration (where a contract in fact existed
but became unenforceable later by reason of failure of
consideration, in which event burden of proof of failure
of consideration is imposed upon defendant.) See Rule
8(c) and 12(h), URCP.
POINT IV
FAILURE TO DENY P L A I N T I F F ' S FALSE ALLEGATION OF CONSIDERATION WAS NOT A WAIVER
BY BUTCHERS OF THE D E F E N S E OF ABSENCE OF
CONSIDERATION

A waiver is "The intentional or voluntary
relinquishment of a known right." Black's Law Dictionary,
revised fourth edition, and cases there cited. It is undisputed that at the time Butchers attorney filed their answer neither he nor they were aware that the indemnity
agreement sued upon was void for absence of consideration (R. 212, 421), and that when Butchers counsel be-
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came aware of that fact he moved the court for dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint and to amend the answer to conform to the evidence (R. 122, 410, 417-421). Since Butchers were not aware of the facts necessary to know that
consideration was absent, there could be no waiver of the
lack of consideration defense by not raising that defense
in the original answer.
Plaintiff's counsel argued (R. 133) (apparently successfully R. 147-149) to the Court that absence of consideration is an affirmative defense which is waived if
not asserted in the answer. Rule 8(c), URCP, lists various affirmative defenses which must be pleaded or they
are deemed to be waived under Rule 12(h), URCP. One
of the listed defenses is "failure of consideration." Failure to plead such an affirmative defense does not preclude proof of such a defense at a trial in all cases. See
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.(2d) 205, 381 P.2d 86.
Counsel for plaintiff and the Court apparently failed
to observe the distinction between absence of consideration (never was an enforceable contract) and failure of
consideration (valid contract terminated because of subsequent failure of consideration). (See discussion under
Point I above). Rule 8(c), URCP, requires an affirmative allegation only where the consideration fails, not
where the consideration was wholly absent. Zebod v.
Hurst, 65 Okla 248, 166 P. 99, 61 Am J u r 2d Pleading
Sec. 160.
A denial by Butchers of the consideration allega-
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tion in plaintiff's complaint would have violated the
letter and spirit of Rule 11, URCP, (good ground to support pleadings). Butchers should not be penalized for
honesty in their pleadings, and plaintiff should not be
rewarded with an undeserving judgment because Butchers did not discover the falseness of the consideration
allegations in plaintiff's complaint until contrary evidence was produced by plaintiff during the trial. Public
policy should favor the pleader who honestly admitted
that which he believed to be true. To hold otherwsie
would encourage denial of facts not really in dispute to
avoid such pitfalls should evidence at the trial establish
new facts as in our case.
The allegation of consideration in plaintiff's complaint was false. Plaintiff now seeks to take advantage of
it's false pleading and it's own wrong by claiming prejudice because Butchers did not learn that it was false until
trial.
POINT V
THE D E F E N S E OF FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
FOR R E L I E F UPON WHICH R E L I E F CAN BE GRANTED MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE
TRIAL

Rule 12(h), URCP, reads in part as follows:
"A party waives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion . . . or in
his answer . . ., except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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. . . may also be made by a later pleading, . . .
motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
on the merits, . . . The objection or defense, if
at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may
been received." (Emphasis added).

by a
trial
made
Rule
have

Plaintiff's original complaint falsely stated that the
indemnity agreement sued upon was executed in consideration of issuance of the bond (which in fact had
already been issued), and accordingly appeared to state
a claim for relief upon which relief could have been
granted until contrary evidence was presented by plaintiff (Ex. 1-P & 4-P). In plaintiff's answer to Butchers'
interrogatories (R. 79, Par. 1 ( b ) ( 3 ) & 92) plaintiff disclosed facts which, if carefully studied, would have informed Butchers' counsel of the defense of absence of
consideration (filed over a year late — about four
months before the trial — R. 61 & 78). Plaintiff's pleadings were thereby amended or superseded by evidence
of the actual facts, and it then first appeared affirmatively in the record that there was in fact no consideration
for the indemnity agreement, and that plaintiff's complaint (as modified by answers to interrogatories and by
actual evidence) did not state a claim for relief upon
which relief could be granted. Under Rule 12 (h), URCP,
(quoted above), after the answers to interrogatories were
in the record, (R. 78-106), Butchers were entitled, at
their option, to either move to amend their answer to
raise the defense of absence of consideration or to raise
that defense at the trial. Butchers' counsel failed to
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observe the facts showing lack of consideration in reviewing the answers to interrogatories and accordingly
first raised the defense when plaintiff presented exhibits
1-P and 4-P into evidence at the trial, which procedure
is expressly authorized by Rule 12(h), URCP, (quoted
above). Rule 12(h), URCP, directs the Court to "dispose
of" such a defense raised for the first time at trial under
Rule 15(b), URCP. Rule 15(b), URCP, reads in part as
follows:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised by the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence." (emphasis
added)
Rule 15(b), URCP, is modified by Rule 12(h), URCP, (quoted above), to add the proviso that if the de-
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fense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is raised at the trial, then that defense
". . . shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in light of any evidence that may have been received."
Accordingly, the defense of absence of consideration was
properly first raised at the trial, and as provided in Rules
12(h) and 15(b), URCP, that defense is ". . . treated
in all respects as if they (it) had been raised by the
pleadings/' particularly in view of the additional provision in Rule 15(b), URCP, that permits the Court to allow pleadings to be amended ". . . when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby . . "
A determination of this case on the merits requires a determination that the indemnity agreement is void for
absence of consideration and dismissal of plaintiff's
claims as to Butchers. Justice requires that such an
amendment of the pleadings be permitted.
In Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 299 P.2d
832, 5 U.(2d) 204, the Supreme Court affirmed a denial
of a motion to amend made at the trial, allegedly to
conform to the evidence. In that case the Court found
that the facts upon which the defense of statute of limitations was founded were well known and were pleaded,
but that the pleading failed to assert that defense. In
our case the facts were not known when the answer was
filed, nor were those facts pleaded by plaintiff. In that
case the Court also found that to defeat the plaintiff's
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claim by the bar of the statute of limitations is not a
determination of the case on its merits. In our case to
defeat plaintiff's claim by reason of absence of consideration is in fact a determination of the case on the merits.
See also Meyer v. Deluke, 23 U.(2d) 74, 457 P.2d 966,
denying amendment where facts supporting defense of
usury were known and pleaded without pleading the defense of usury.
When plaintiff introduced the bond and indemnity
agreement into evidence (Ex. 1-P & 4-P) showing the
absence of consideration, plaintiff by implication consented within the meaning of Rule 15(b), URCP, to a
trial of that issue as though it had been raised by the
pleadings and waived it's right to object to that defense
being raised by Butchers. The material variance of the
evidence from plaintiff's pleadings concerning consideration is sufficient to justify a nonsuit. Vance v. Whalon,
7 U. 44, 24 P. 672; 61 Am Jur 2d Sec. 366, 376 & 378.

POINT VI
P L A I N T I F F WAS NOT PREJUDICED IN IT'S DEF E N S E RE ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION BY ANY
ACT DONE BY BUTCHERS

The evidence which established the absence of consideration was received without objection from plaintiff,
who itself presented that evidence (Ex. 1-P & Ex. 4-P).
Rule 15 (b), URCP, imposes a duty upon a party to object
to evidence concerning issues not raised by the pleadDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ings. Plaintiff is bound by the unfavorable aspects of
the evidence which it produced. Ray v. Consolidated
Freightways, 289 P.2d 196, 4 U. (2d) 137. Plaintiff cannot now escape the legal effect of that evidence.
Had plaintiff pleaded the date of issuance of the
bond (Ex. 4-P) and the date of execution of the Butcher
indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P), then plaintiff's complaint would have had a "built in" defense. (See 5
Wright & Miller, Fed. Practices & Proc, Sec. 1226 and
1355 and cases there cited.) Plaintiff as an expert in the
bonding business is held to a higher standard of care
than defendants who are lay persons who lacked information to ascertain that the indemnity agreement was
void, a fact which should have been known to plaintiff
from the inception. Plaintiff was not misled by Butchers
ignorance.
It is true, as observed by the Court in it's memorandum decision (R. 148), that had counsel for Butchers
been more astute he would have been aware of the defense of absence of consideration four months before
trial when plaintiff answered Butchers interrogatories
(which answers were over a year late), and accordingly
could have moved to amend to assert that defense prior
to trial. Rule 15(b), URCP, reads in part as follows:
". . . If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. The Court
shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence." (emphasis
added)
Plaintiff's argument is that because the trial occurred 5% years after the lawsuit was commenced (R. 4
& 112-115), since Plaintiff's local agent (Mills) has destroyed some of his old files, since a former employee of
plaintiff's home office who worked on the issuance of
the bonds involved in this lawsuit could not be located,
and since plaintiff's attorney might have conducted further discovery procedure had the consideration issue
been raised earlier (in an alleged effort to learn if Butcher had made an oral promise to become an indemnitor,
which if established might have provided the missing
consideration), that plaintiff is somehow prejudiced and
Butchers should therefore be held liable on a void indemnity agreement (R. 131-146, 148). It is important
to note that plaintiff does not claim that Butchers had
notice of the availability of the absence of consideration
defense until plaintiff answered Butchers' interrogatories or that they had actual notice prior to trial. Plaintiff does not claim that it would have been better able to
respond to that defense had Butchers amended their answer four months before trial when plaintiff finally answered Butchers' interrogatories. This failure to amend
appears to have been heavily relied upon by the Court
in it's memorandum decision (R. 148), however since
that failure did not prejudice plaintiff in meeting the de-
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fense of absence of consideration, failure to amend at
that time is insufficient to justify refusal of Butchers
motion to amend to conform to the evidence as provided
by Rule 15(b), URCP.
Had plaintiff diligently prosecuted this lawsuit the
51/2 year delay before trial would not have occurred and
the claimed prejudice would not exist. Plaintiff knew
that there were problems with the bonded project shortly
after the bond was issued (R. 310, 314-321 and Ex. 32DI).
The lawsuit was commenced in June, 1969, (R. 2). It
was almost two years later when plaintiff first requested
a trial date (R. 47). No discovery procedure was prosecuted by plaintiff until July, 1972 when one deposition
was taken, (R. 59). Plaintiff engaged in no other discovery. Butchers submitted interrogatories (R. 61)
which plaintiff did not answer for over a year (R. 78)
and then only after repeated motions to dismiss for failure to answer (R. 67, 69, 70, 72, 74, 77, 107). Four trial
dates were vacated because of plaintiff's failure to
answer discovery (R. 72-74, 77, 110). The delay was
entirely the responsibility and fault of plaintiff, who
now cries "prejudice" and points to that delay as an excuse. Certainly a party should not be permitted to take
advantage of it's own wrong. Plaintiff's claim of absence
of a former employee is unfounded when we consider
the testimony of Mills (plaintiff's agent) who stated
that no particular individual handled the issuance of the
bond and that there was no continuity in follow through
and that three or four people from the Denver office
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worked on the matter (R. 382-384); the claim of missing
files is unfounded when we consider that the home office
"had copies of everything" (R. 383) and that plaintiff had
notice of the problems with the bonded project at an
early date and destroyed files thereafter at it's peril.
Plaintiff's claim of prejudice is that had it known
of this defense earlier it might have been able to find
evidence to overcome the defense if in fact any such evidence in fact existed (which we deny). Plaintiff has not
pointed to any specific evidence which if proven would
entitle it to judgment against Butcher, but has simply
speculated that such evidence might have existed and
might now be unavailable due to passage of time. Such
a speculation is insufficient to impose liability of over
$44,000.00 upon Butchers who never were legally bound
to plaintiff on any contract. The judgment should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
Butchers never were liable to plaintiff under any
contract in evidence in this case. It is undisputed that
the indemnity agreement which they signed was void
and unenforceable for lack of consideration. Plaintiff's
claim that Butchers waived the absence of consideration
defense by not pleading it (although they did not have
facts which would justify such a pleading at the time
that they answered the complaint), and that Butchers
should not be permitted to amend their answer to conform to the evidence of absence of consideration pro-
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duced at the trial by plaintiff because of alleged prejudice resulting from delay of 5% years in bringing case
to trial (which delay was solely the result of failure of
plaintiff to prosecute and to answer Butchers' interrogatories), are unfounded. Plaintiff falsely alleged in it's
complaint that the indemnity agreement was supported
by consideration, without pleading dates from which
that defense could be determined.
Plaintiff failed to sustain it's burden of persuasion
and of proof by itself introducing evidence which showed that plaintiff was not entitled to recover against Butchers. The bond was issued in reliance upon indemnity
agreements from third parties and plaintiff was bound
on the bond long before Butchers signed the indemnity
agreement. Plaintiff is not entitled to a windfall by
judgment against Butchers on an unenforceable contract.
The judgment should be vacated and the case dismissed
as to Butchers.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 486-9636
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellants
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